Adverse Selection and Technological Change: Evidence from Medicare Part D
Abstract
New medical technologies are increasingly expensive. These high-cost innovations make generous health insurance coverage more valuable for individuals at risk of needing new therapies. However, if those individuals are also costlier to insure, innovation may generate adverse selection. I develop a conceptual framework to study this trade-off and examine it empirically using data from Medicare Part D, the prescription drug insurance program for the elderly. I first show that an innovation shock driven by high-cost new drug approvals in the mid-2010s generated substantial adverse selection against Part D plans with generous coverage for those drugs, increasing those plans’ average costs by 35%. In the years following the shock, the market exhibits hallmark patterns of dynamic adverse selection: switchers into generous coverage are high-cost and more likely to use the new drugs; premiums rise by 52%; and price sensitive low-cost enrollees switch out of generous plans. Ultimately, the market significantly unravels, as the market share for the generous plans falls by 49%. Using a structural model of plan choice, I show that this unraveling leads to inefficiently low equilibrium enrollment in the generous plans and raises prices for those who remain enrolled, substantially reducing the insurance value of generous coverage and decreasing ex-ante social surplus. More robust reinsurance and risk adjustment policies would limit the losses from selection.
